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ABSTRACT
Aviation safety has improved dramatically in the last 50 years as evidenced by
declining mishap rates. Improvements in aviation safety have come about primarily
through work on two fronts; mechanical improvements (aircraft and its support systems)
and human improvements (human interface, training and process interaction). Safety
improvements on the hardware side of aviation have come relatively quickly and
continuously, paralleling advances in engineering and science. Today’s aircraft have
become extremely reliable machines with redundancy built into every system.
Unfortunately, while the overall aviation mishap rate has declined, the percentage
of accidents attributed to “human error” has steadily increased. Strides in the human or
software side of aviation safety have not kept pace with the mechanical or hardware
advances. Most think of “human error” in terms of the individual, be it pilot, controller,
or mechanic. A less obvious aspect is the organizational responsibility to aviation safety.
Why is one airline or squadron able to maintain a perfect safety record with the same
machines and personnel available to other less successful organizations?
This thesis will examine a Judge Advocate General (JAG) Investigation (written
and conducted by the author) of a Landing Mishap involving a Navy FA-18 Hornet. The
mishap is significant because a key causal factor was poor organizational climate. The
analysis of real-world mistakes and lessons learned in a “high risk” organization will aid
in identifying the warning signs of a failing organization and assist in producing some
practical solutions towards improving the safety of any aviation organization.
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PREFACE

The Command Investigation of the FA-18 Aircraft Accident contained within this
thesis was obtained from the Judge Advocate General, Commander, Naval Air Forces
through the Freedom of Information Act. The naval mishap statistics used were obtained
from the Naval Safety Center database. The analysis, opinions, conclusions, and
recommendations expressed herein are those of the author and do not represent the
official position of the Commander, Naval Air Forces, the Naval Safety Center, or the
United States Department of the Navy. The author’s recommendations should not be
considered attributable to any of the aforementioned authorities or for any purposes other
than the fulfillment of the thesis requirement.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

1

BACKGROUND

1

SCOPE

3

CHAPTER 2 – FA-18 LANDING MISHAP INVESTIGATION

4

INTRODUCTION

4

MISHAP INVESTIGATION REPORT

5

Preliminary Statement

7

Findings of Facts

14

I. Background (Aircraft)

14

II. Background (Flight Schedule)

14

III. Background (Mishap Pilot)

16

IV. Background (LSO)

18

V. Background (Other FCLP Pilots/ODO)

19

VI. Background (NAS Lemoore/Reeves Field)

20

VII. Background (Tower Controllers)

22

VIII. Flight Brief

22

IX. Sequence of Events

25

X. Command Climate

31

XI. Risk Mitigation

33

XII. Damages and Costs

39

Opinions

39

I. Causal/Contributing Factors

39

II. Recommendations for Administrative or
Disciplinary Action

v

44

CHAPTER 3 – ANALYSIS

46

INTRODUCTION

46

EXAMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL ACTS

48

EXAMINATION OF PRECONDITIONS

52

EXAMINATION OF SUPERVISION

56

EXAMINATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES

57

CHAPTER 4 – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

62

CONCLUSIONS

62

RECOMMENDATIONS

63

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

66

VITA

68

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table

Page

1

Mishap Event Pilots and Aircraft

20

2

Published Approaches Available at Time of Mishap

21

3

NAS Lemoore ACLS Reliability by Quarter

22

4

Mishap Aircraft Damage Costs

39

5

DOD Property Damage (Arresting Gear)

40

6

Selected Examples of Unsafe Acts

51

7

Selected Examples of Preconditions for Unsafe Acts

55

8

Selected Examples of Unsafe Supervision

58

9

Selected Examples of Organizational Influences

60

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

Page

1

Decline in Naval Aircraft Mishap Rate FY50-98

1

2

All Navy-Marine Corps Mishaps 1977-1992

2

3

HFACS’s Swiss cheese model

48

4

Unsafe Acts Classification

49

5

Preconditions for Unsafe Acts Classification

53

6

Unsafe Supervision Classification

56

7

Organization Influences Classification

59

viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACLS

Automatic Carrier Landing System

AFB

Air Force Base

AGL

Above Ground Level

ALS

Approach Lighting System

AMB

Aircraft Mishap Board

AOM

All Officer Meeting

ASR

Airport Surveillance Radar

ATC

Air Traffic Control

ATCFO

Air Traffic Control Facilities Officer

BFM

Basic Fighter Maneuvers

CAG

Commander Air Group (Wing)

CAPT

Navy Captain (O-6)

CATM

Captive-carry Air Training Missile

CDR

Navy Commander (O-5)

CI

Command Investigation

CO

Commanding Officer

CODR

Conventional Ordnance Deficiency Report

COMPTUEX

Composite Training Unit Exercise

CNAP

Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific

CQ

Carrier Qualification

CSFWP

Commander Strike Fighter Wing Pacific
ix

CVW

Carrier Air Wing

DA

Decision Altitude

DCAG

Deputy Commander Air Group (Wing)

DH

Decision Height

DOD

Department of Defense

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FAA INST

Federal Aviation Administration Instruction

FCLP

Field Carrier Landing Practice

FLIP

Flight Information Publication

FOF

Finding of Fact

FOIA

Freedom of Information Act

GCA

Ground Controlled Approach

GMT

Greenwich Mean Time

GPA

Grade Point Average

HAZREP

Hazard Report

HFACS

Human Factors Analysis and Classification System

HIRL

High Intensity Runway Lighting

ICLS

Instrument Carrier Landing System

IDTC

Inter-Deployment Turnaround Cycle

IO

Investigating Officer

IFR

Instrument Flight Rules

ILS

Instrument Landing System

IMC

Instrument Meteorological Conditions
x

IMER

Integrated Multiple Ejector Rack

JAG

Judge Advocate General

JTFEX

Joint Task Force Exercise

LATR

Large Area Tracking Range

LCDR

Navy Lieutenant Commander (O-4)

LSO

Landing Signal Officer

LT

Navy Lieutenant (O-3)

LTJG

Navy Lieutenant Junior Grade (O-2)

MA

Mishap Aircraft

MDA

Minimum Descent Altitude

MF

Mishap Flight

MLG

Main Landing Gear

MP

Mishap Pilot

MSG

Message (Naval)

NADEP

Naval Air Depot

NAF

Naval Air Field

NAMP

Naval Aviation Maintenance Program

NAS

Naval Air Station

NASLEMINST

Naval Air Station Lemoore Instruction

NATOPS

Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures
Standardization

NAWS

Naval Air Weapons Station

NOTAMS

Notice to Airmen
xi

ODO

Operations Duty Officer

OPNAVINST

Chief of Naval Operations Instruction

OPS O

Operations Officer

ORM

Operational Risk Management

PAR

Precision Approach Radar

PERSTEMPO

Personnel Tempo

RAG

Replacement Air Group

REIL

Runway End Identifier Lights

RVR

Runway Visual Range

SDO

Squadron Duty Officer

SFARP

Strike Fighter Advanced Readiness Program

SFWSP

Strike Fighter Weapons School Pacific

SFWT

Strike Fighter Weapons Training

SFWTI

Strike Fighter Weapons Training Instructor

SLATS

Strike Leader Attack Training Syllabus

SOP

Standard Operating Procedures

SORM

Standard Organization Regulations Manual

TACAN

Tactical Air Navigation

VFA

Navy Strike Fighter squadron

VFR

Visual Flight Rules

VMC

Visual Meteorological Conditions

WSCO

Weapons School Commanding Officer

XO

Executive Officer
xii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
In high hazard organizations, where the risk of error may involve dire
consequences, leaders aggressively strive for safe, reliable performance. Within Naval
Aviation, significant strides have been made in reducing aircraft mishaps over the last
fifty years. Improvements such as the angling of aircraft carrier flight decks,
establishment of the Navy Aviation Safety Center, and creation of the Naval Aviation
Maintenance Program (NAMP) were early efforts established to mitigate risk and reduce
mishaps. These early programs were very successful in reducing aircraft accidents as
shown in figure 1. They focused primarily on mechanical safety improvements, as this
was the primary cause of most early aircraft mishaps.

776 aircraft
destroyed in

33 aircraft
destroyed in
1998

1954
60

Angled decks
Aviation Safety Center

50

Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP), 1959
40

RAG concept initiated
NATOPS Program, 1961

30

Squadron Safety program
20

System Safety Designated Aircraft
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10
0
50
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65

95

98

Fiscal Year

Figure 1. Decline in Naval Aircraft Mishap Rate FY50-98 (Naval Safety Center)
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Follow-on improvements continued this trend in mishap reduction. Creation of
Replacement Air Groups (RAG’s) enabled naval aviators to receive platform specific
training prior to being assigned to their fleet squadron. This combined with the Naval Air
Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) program enabled new
pilots to receive standardized training from experienced instructors in a safe environment,
a revolutionary departure from past training methods. Follow-on efforts such as the
establishment of Squadron Safety Programs and System Safety Designated Aircraft also
played a significant role.
By the early 1990’s a disturbing trend was noticed. While errors attributable to
mechanical causes had continued to decline to almost zero, human errors did not decline
at nearly the same rate. They had actually begun to increase in 1989 as shown in figure
2. It became clear, as human error became the primary causal factor in most naval
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mishaps, that a shift in focus was required. The Naval Safety Center responded by

Figure 2. All Navy-Marine Corps Mishaps 1977-1992 (Naval Safety Center)
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developing tools such as the Aircrew Coordination Training program and online
squadron safety surveys. While these efforts were steps in the right direction, they were
little more than stopgap fixes. To achieve significant reduction in human error as a
causal factor, an applicable model of human behavior was required. With an accurate
model, significant steps could be taken to mitigate the risk of human failure and improve
safety. The Naval Safety Center created this model in their Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS) based on James Reason’s Swiss cheese model of human
error.

SCOPE
This thesis will use an actual aircraft accident to test the accuracy of the Navy’s
HFACS model. The mishap was a United States Navy FA-18 Hornet landing accident at
NAS Lemoore, CA. The aircraft was fully functional at the time of mishap and there
were no casual factors attributed to mechanical malfunction, making it an ideal candidate
for the study of human failure. After reviewing the official investigation, analysis, and
conclusions, the landing mishap will be subjected to the Navy’s HFACS model, a
modernized version of the domino theory, to identify the active and latent failures that
contributed to the mishap. The analysis will identify shortcomings in the HFAC model
(it did not prevent this mishap) and discuss some the possible warning signs of failing
organizations. Finally and most importantly, it will provide some practical solutions
towards improving the safety of any high-risk organization.
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CHAPTER 2
FA-18 LANDING MISHAP INVESTIGATION

INTRODUCTION
This chapter is the Command Investigation of the Class A aircraft accident that
occurred at Naval Air Station Lemoore, California on 06 January 2003. It was officially
requested and released through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Per the FOIA,
all names and personal information regarding the mishap pilot and individual witnesses
has been removed (blacked out). No changes were made to the investigation report other
than formatting and font adjustments to ensure it remains an accurate representation. The
Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) requires copies of all reference material be
included as part of the formal mishap report. While the FOIA provided copies of this
material, it will not be included in this thesis for size consideration. The information is
referenced as enclosures within the formal report and can be assumed verified by the
Navy Investigation process.
All the work involved with this command investigation including, research,
interviews, finding of facts, conclusions, and report generation, was my own. Although
the style is somewhat legalistic, the salient points are easily comprehended and provide
an outstanding real-world backdrop for organizational safety culture and its importance to
risk and mishap reduction efforts.
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MISHAP INVESTIGATION REPORT
21 Feb 03

From: CDR Peter J. Kind, USN, 391-48-4475/1310
To:

Commander, Carrier Air Wing Eleven

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION OF THE CLASS A AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
THAT OCCURRED AT NAS LEMOORE (NASL) ON 06 JANUARY 2003

Ref:

(a) Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN)

Encl: (1) CVW-11 ltr 5830 of 23 Jan 03
(2) Copy of ILS discrepancy an acft 304
(3) Copy of notes from 25/26 Jan 03 interviews with LT -------------- (VFA-97)
(4) Copy of VFA-97 Flight Schedule of 06 Jan 03
(5) Copy of notes from 26 Jan 03 interview with CDR --------------- (VFA-97
Commanding Officer)
(6) Copy of notes from 25 Jan 03 interview with LCDR --------------- (VFA-97)
(7) Copy of NATOPS Landing Signal Officer Manual pages 3-1,3-2
(8) Copy of MP Clearance Notice (Aero medical)
(9) Copy of MP NATOPS Evaluation Report
(10) Copy of MP Instrument Rating Request
(11) Copy of MP Physiology/Survival Training
(12) Copy of MP Ejection Seat Training
(13) Copy of MP Orders to VFA-97
(14) Copy of MP VFA-125 Training Jacket Summary
(15) Copy of VFA-125 Pilot Performance Summary for Class FY02-02
(16) Copy of notes from 25 Jan 03 interview with LCDR -------------------(VFA-97)
(17) Copy of MP Landing Performance Summary for CVW-11 (Includes CAG
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LSO Comments)
(18) Copy of VFA-97 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)
(19) Copy of notes from 26 Jan 03 interview with LT ----------------(CVW-11 Flight Surgeon)
(20) Copy of CVW-11 Landing Signal Officer Qualification Letter
(21) Copy of notes from 25/26 Jan 03 interviews with LT ------------- (VFA-97)
(22) Copy of notes from 25 Jan 03 interview with LTJG --------------- (VFA-97)
(23) Copy of notes from 25 Jan 03 interview with LT ---------------- (VFA-97)
(24) Copy of notes from 25 Jan 03 interview with LCDR ---------------- (VFA-97)
(25) DOD Standard Instrument Departures Packet
(26) DOD FLIP High Altitude Approach Chart pg XXXI
(27) DOD FLIP IFR – Supplement pg B-361/2, A2/3/10
(28) Copy of notes from 12 Feb 03 interview with LTJG ----------(Air Traffic Control Facility Officer)
(29) Copy of NAS Lemoore Airfield NOTAMs for 06 Jan 03
(30) Copy of notes from 25 Jan 03 interview with LT ------------------- (VFA-97)
(31) NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instruction 3710.7 pg 3-11, 4-2
(32) VFA-97 Shore Admin Brief Guide
(33) Copy of notes from 26 Jan 03, 02 Feb 03, and 16 Feb 03 interviews with
CAPT ----------------- (Commander, Carrier Air Wing Eleven)
(34) Copy of notes from 26 Jan 03 interview with LCDR --------------- (VFA-97)
(35) Copy of notes from 25/26 Jan 03 interviews with LT ---------------- and
LT --------------- (CVW-11 Landing Signal Officers)
(36) Lemoore Metro 06 Jan 03 Surface Observation Request
(37) Audio-tape Transcripts of Tower/Approach/Departure and Final Controller
for Mishap Event
(38) NAS Lemoore Instruction 3710.1M pg III-11/12
(39) FAA Instruction 7110.65N pg 3-4-1/2/3/4
(40) Copy of notes from 12 Feb 03 interview with AC1 -----------------(NAS Lemoore Tower Supervisor)
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(41) NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions 3710.7S pg 5-19, 5-20
(42) Copy of written statement by LT ------------(43) Copy of notes from 26 Jan 03 interview with LT --------------- (VFA-97)
(44) Copy of notes from 26 Jan 03 interview with CAPT -------------(Commander, Strike-Fighter Wing Pacific)
(45) Copy of notes from 26 Jan 03 interview with CDR -------------(VFA-97 Executive Officer)
(46) VFA-97 SFWT Qualification Sheet
(47) NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions 3710.7S pg 8-6, 8-7
(48) COMNAVAIRPAC ORM MSG DTG 191006ZJUL01
(49) CVW-11 Safety Incident Summary
(50) Copy of notes from 12 Feb 03 interview with ------------(NAS Lemoore Weather Forecaster).
(51) Copy of notes from 05 Feb 03 interview with CDR -----------------(SFWSP Commanding Officer)
(52) VFA-97 Maintenance Work Schedule (24 Nov – 25 Jan)
(53) Damage and Costs Email from VFA-97 Maintenance
(54) CNAP Mishap Rates FY01-Present
Preliminary Statement

1. As directed by Enclosure (1) and in accordance with reference (a), a one-officer
Command Investigation (CI) not requiring a hearing, was conducted to investigate the
cause, resulting damages, and the responsibility for a landing mishap of a single FA-18A
aircraft that happened on 06 January 2003. The mishap occurred on Runway 32R at
Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA, while conducting night Field Carrier Landing Practice
(FCLP). The Mishap occurred as the pilot was flying final landing after the FCLP
mission was canceled for deteriorating weather. Aircraft salvage was conducted and all
recoverable parts have been obtained. There was no civilian personnel or property
damage, destruction or loss. There has been no environmental impact reported as a result
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of this mishap. No claims against the government have been made, and none are
anticipated. This investigation reports the Findings of Fact, Opinions, and
Recommendations regarding the circumstances surrounding the aircraft accident.

2. This mishap meets the statutory requirements for a single member investigation stated
in section 0242c(2) of reference (a). I meet the statutory requirements as an investigator
for a single member investigation stated in section 0242c(2) of reference (a). I am a
Commander in the United States Navy. I have 12 years experience flying FA-18 aircraft
and have served as a Carrier Air Wing Operations Officer, Fleet Replacement Squadron
Training Officer, and Operations, Maintenance, Safety Officer in an operational FA-18C
squadron. Additionally, I am a graduate of the United States Navy Safety Officer Course
and Operational Risk Management (ORM) course.

3. All reasonable relevant evidence was collected and analyzed. The directives of the
convening authority established in enclosure (1) have been met. There were no
difficulties encountered during the conduct of this investigation.

4. The style of this report is written so that a non-aviator can readily understand it. Some
familiarity with naval organization, operations, terminology and culture is assumed.
Specific aviator acronyms are expanded, and to the maximum extent possible aviation
specific terminology is explained.

5. All witnesses were advised of the differences between the Aircraft Mishap Board
(AMB) investigation and this CI. All individuals interviewed provided complete
cooperation and as far as the Investigating Officer (IO) is concerned, all relevant facts are
known.

6. Original photographs are being maintained with the Naval Safety Center, Norfolk,
VA, DSN --------.

8

7. Pilot qualification records and flight logbook are being maintained with the VFA-97
Operation Department, NAS Lemoore, CA, phone number ------------.

8. The aircraft and logbook are located at NADEP Test Line, Building 785, NAS North
Island, CA, phone number -------------.

9. Original enclosures are maintained by VFA-122 Legal Department, Hangar Five,
NAS Lemoore, CA. Point of contact: VFA-122 Legal Officer, LTJG --------, -------------.

10. To assist the reader in understanding the findings of this report, the following
abbreviations and definition of terms are provided.

a. Minimum Decision Altitude (MDA). The lowest altitude, expressed in feet
above mean sea level, to which descent is authorized on final approach or during circleto-land maneuvering in execution of a standard instrument approach where no electronic
glide slope is provided.

b. Decision Altitude/Height (DA/DH). A specified altitude or height in the
precision approach at which a missed approach must be initiated if the required visual
reference to continue the approach has not been established.
Decision Altitude (DA) is referenced to Mean Sea Level (MSL) and Decision
Height (DH) is referenced to the threshold elevation.
The required visual reference means that section of the visual aids or of the
approach area which should have been in view for sufficient time for the pilot to have
made an assessment of the aircraft position and rate of change of position, in relation to
the desired flight path.

c. Ground Controlled Approach (GCA). A radar approach system operated from
the ground by air traffic control personnel transmitting instructions to the pilot by radio.
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The approach may be conducted with surveillance radar (ASR) only or with both
surveillance and precision approach radar (PAR).

d. Precision Approach Radar (PAR). Radar equipment in some ATC facilities
operated by the FAA and/or military services at joint-use civil/military locations and
separate military installations to detect and display azimuth, elevation, and range of
aircraft on the final approach course to a runway. This equipment may be used to
monitor certain non-radar approaches, but it is primarily used to conduct a precision
instrument approach (PAR) wherein the controller issues guidance instructions to the
pilot based on the aircraft’s position in relation to the final approach course (azimuth), the
glide path (elevation), and the distance (range) from the touchdown point on the runway
as displayed on the radar scope.

e. Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR). Approach control radar used to detect and
display an aircraft’s position in the terminal area. ASR provides range and azimuth
information but does not provide elevation data. Coverage of the ASR can extend up 60
NM.

f. Surveillance Approach. An instrument approach wherein the air traffic
controller issues instructions, for pilot’s compliance, based on aircraft position in relation
to the final approach course (azimuth), and the distance (range) from the end of the
runway as displayed on the controller’s radar scope. The controller will provide
recommended altitudes on final approach if requested by the pilot.

g. Non-precision Approach. A standard instrument approach in which no
electronic glide slope is provided; e.g., TACAN and ASR approaches.

h. Precision Approach. A standard instrument approach in which an electronic
glide slope/glide path is provided; e.g., PAR and ILS.
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i. Non-radar Approach. Used to describe instrument approaches for which course
guidance on final approach is not provided by ground-based precision or surveillance
radar.

j. Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN). An ultra-high frequency electronic rhotheta air navigation aid, which provides suitably equipped aircraft a continuous indication
of bearing and distance to the selected TACAN station.

k. Automatic Carrier Landing System (ACLS). United States Navy final
approach equipment consisting of precision tracking radar coupled to a computer data
link to provide continuous information to the aircraft, monitoring capability to the pilot,
and a precision approach system. ACLS allows the pilot to “couple up”, flying a handsoff approach all the way to touchdown.

l. Approach Light System (ALS). An airport lighting facility which provides
guidance to landing aircraft by radiating light beams in a directional pattern by which the
pilot aligns the aircraft with the extended centerline of the runway on his/her final
approach for landing.

m. Final Controller. The controller providing information and final approach
guidance during PAR and ASR approaches utilizing radar equipment.

n. Runway Lights/Runway Edge Lights. Lights having a prescribed angle of
emission used to define the lateral limits of a runway. Runway lights are uniformly
spaced at intervals of approximately 200 feet, and the intensity may be preset or
controlled.

o. Touchdown Zone Lighting. Two rows of transverse light bars located
symmetrically about the runway centerline normally at 100 foot intervals. The basic
system extends 3000 feet along the runway.
11

p. Runway Centerline Lighting. Flush centerline lights spaced at 50-foot
intervals beginning 75 feet from the landing threshold and extending to within 75 feet of
the opposite end of the runway.

q. Threshold Lights. Fixed green lights arranged symmetrically left and right of
the runway centerline, identifying the runway threshold.

r. Runway End Identifier Lights (REIL). Two synchronized flashing lights, one
on each side of the runway threshold, which provide rapid and positive identification of
the approach end of a particular runway.

s. Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). Metrological conditions
expressed in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling less than the minima
specified for visual meteorological conditions.

t. Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC). Metrological conditions expressed
in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling equal to or better than the minima
specified for visual meteorological conditions

u. Tower. A terminal facility that uses air/ground communications, visual
signaling, and other devices to provide ATC services to aircraft operating in the vicinity
of an airport or on the movement area. Authorizes aircraft to land or takeoff at the airport
controlled by the tower or to transit the Class D airspace area regardless of flight plan or
weather conditions.

v. Approach Control Service. Air traffic control service provided by an approach
control facility for arriving and departing VFR/IFR aircraft and, on occasion, en route
aircraft.
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w. Tule Fog. A radiation fog most commonly occurring from December through
February in California’s Central Valley. This fog normally develops from the ground up
and typically forms as the ground cools off at night and radiates heat into space. In the
vicinity of NAS Lemoore, Tule fog will begin forming over the farmlands and the wind
can advect this fog over the runways very quickly. This can happen in five minutes or
less. Horizontal visibility can be reduced to only a few feet, making driving extremely
dangerous.

x. Operational Risk Management (ORM). A decision making tool used by
people at all levels to increase operational effectiveness by anticipating hazards and
reducing the potential for loss. The purpose of ORM is to minimize risks to acceptable
levels, proportional to mission accomplishment. The goal of ORM is to manage risk so
the mission can be accomplished with the minimum amount of loss.

11. The findings of fact are divided into areas of interests as follows:

I.

Background (Aircraft)

II.

Background (Flight Schedule)

III.

Background (Mishap Pilot)

IV.

Background (Landing Signal Officer (LSO))

V.

Background (Other Pilots / SDO)

VI.

Background (NAS Lemoore / Reeves Field)

VII.

Background (Tower / Approach Controllers)

VIII.

Flight Brief

IX.

Sequence of Events

X.

Command Climate

XI.

Risk Mitigation

XII.

Damages and Costs
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Findings of Fact

I. Background (Aircraft)

1. The mishap aircraft’s (MA) Instrument Landing System (ILS) was inoperative at the
time of the mishap. (Enclosure 2)

2. Mishap Pilot (MP) stated that except for the ILS, the aircraft was operating normally
at time of mishap. (Enclosure 3)

3. Investigating Officer conducted a thorough review of MA logbook and all
discrepancies. Nothing was found to indicate a maintenance causal or contributing factor
in this mishap.

II. Background (Flight Schedule)

4. The mishap flight (MF) was a scheduled sortie to be flown on 06 JAN 03 with a
2045L brief / 2215L take-off / 2315L land time. The mission was night Field Carrier
Landing Practice (FCLP). (Enclosure 4)

5. The Squadron Duty Officer (SDO) smooth copy of the flight schedule for 06 JAN 03
was not signed by VFA-97’s Commanding Officer. (Enclosure 4)

6. VFA-97 Commanding Officer (CO) stated he either signed or verbally approved the
flight schedule for 06 JAN 2003. (Enclosure 5)

7. VFA-97 flight schedule for 06 JAN 2003 had multiple changes made the day of
execution. (Enclosure 4)
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8. VFA-97 CO stated the number of schedule changes for 06 JAN 03 was greater than
normal. He stated that he approved each flight schedule change and was not
uncomfortable with the number of changes. (Enclosure 5)

9. The MF was originally scheduled for six pilots. Only four “up” aircraft were available
to execute the mission. As a result, only four pilots flew the FCLP mission. (Enclosure
4)

10. The assigned Mission Commander for the mishap event was one of the pilots
cancelled for lack of aircraft. (Enclosure 4)

11. No new Mission Commander was identified by SDO or VFA-97 CO. CO stated that
the senior member in the flight would normally be the Mission Commander. (Enclosure
5)

12. The senior pilot in the mishap flight was not on the original flight schedule. He was
notified one hour prior to brief that he was a “write-in” for the mishap event. He was not
informed that he was the senior pilot in the flight or the Mission Commander. He did not
attend the brief and was not aware of his Mission Commander responsibilities until the
flight walked for their aircraft. (Enclosure 6)

13. LSO NATOPS states the requirement for night FCLP with more than two aircraft in
the pattern is one LSO and one person to assist the controlling LSO. (Enclosure 7)

14. VFA-97 flight schedule only had one LSO scheduled to wave the mishap FCLP
period with no one scheduled to assist. VFA-97 CO stated he was not aware of the
requirement for two people. (Enclosures 4,5)
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III. Background (Mishap Pilot)

15. The MP had a current medical clearance, NATOPS check, instrument check, ejection
seat and swim/phys qualifications. (Enclosures 8,9,10,11,12)

16. The MP was a first fleet tour active duty line officer, with designator 1315 (pilot),
executing orders assigned to VFA-97. (Enclosure 13)

17. MP completed FA-18 flight training on 24 JUN 02 at VFA-125 in Lemoore, CA.
Her overall grades were ------------------. MP’s overall GPA was ---- out of 98 pilots
graduating in FY01-02. (Enclosures 14,15)

18. MP’s VFA-125 Student Grade Summary sheet shows four flights graded as -----.
However, documentation could only be found on two of the four flights. The first flight
was a FAM-105 (First Solo). A VFA-125 instructor pilot observed MP entering the
overhead at NAS Lemoore at ---------------------------- and graded the flight -----. The
second flight was an SRA-133 (Radar Intercepts). MP ---------------------- while flying in
combat spread and ---------------------------- with the lead aircraft. (Enclosure 14)

19. A VFA-125 Training Officer Review of MP’s progress during training indicates MP
---------------------------------------- and ----------------------------------------------------------.
MP stated to Training Officer that her performance -----------------------------------. VFA125 limited her to one flight a day for the remainder of her training. (Enclosure 14)

20. VFA-97 Operations Officer characterized MP pilot’s performance in VFA-97 as ------------------------, but nothing unsafe. MP was noted as having a good positive attitude.
(Enclosure 16)
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21. MP landing GPA in CVW-11 was ---- and her boarding rate was ----- based on 49
passes flown in VFA-97. CVW-11 LSO’s stated MP had a slightly ----------------- and a -----------------------------------. (Enclosure 17)

22. MP stated that VFA-97 officers were allowed one five-day leave period taken at
Thanksgiving or one of the two Christmas leave periods. MP chose leave over
Thanksgiving and as a result did not take Christmas leave. (Enclosures 3,5)

23. MP worked some portion of everyday between Thanksgiving and the mishap flight
(37 days) except for two Sundays (December 8th/22th), two days at Christmas (25th/26th),
and two days at New Years (1st/2nd). (Enclosure 3)

24. MP came into work Saturday 04 JAN 03 from 1000-2000L and Sunday 05 JAN 03
from 1400-2000L. Squadron Maintenance Department was working that weekend.
(Enclosure 3)

25. VFA-97 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) states that pilot crew day shall not
exceed 14 hours. The “crew day clock” commences with the first (or one hour prior to
flight brief) scheduled event and ends with the last land time or end of the last flightrelated event. (Enclosure 18)

26. On the day of the mishap (06 JAN 03), the MP was scheduled as follows (Enclosure
4):

1100-1200

Carrier Qualification (CQ) Simulator

1530-1630

NATOPS Check Simulator

1830-1930

CQ Lecture

2045-2315

Night FCLP
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27. On the day of the mishap, MP stated she woke and made some phone calls from
home at 0800L to reserve some range time for a flight later in the day. MP came into
work at 1030L. (Enclosure 3)

28. CVW-11’s Flight Surgeon confirmed MP’s post-mishap toxicology report was all
negative. (Enclosure 19)

IV. Background (LSO)

29. The LSO that waved the MF was a first tour pilot fully qualified to conduct FCLP
operations at the field. (Enclosure 20)

30. LSO stated that the two days prior to the mishap, he was in the process of packing
and moving his personal goods in preparation for their possible short-notice deployment.
He also stated that his car was broken into two days prior to the MF and he was working
issues related to that as well. (Enclosure 21)

31. LSO stated he was informed Friday afternoon he was added on the flight schedule to
fly his Strike Fighter Weapons and Tactics (SFWT) Level III Check Flight on Monday
(day of MF). He stayed at work on Sunday until 2230L planning for the flight.
(Enclosure 21)

32. LSO’s first scheduled event on the day of the mishap was a 1200L brief for his
SFWT Level III Check Flight. His last scheduled event was LSO duties for the final
FCLP period ending at 0100L. He stated he came into work at 1015L on the day of the
mishap. (Enclosures 4,21)

33. LSO stated his Level III Check Flight was evaluated as an incomplete/re-fly. He was
told in the debrief that he most likely would have failed the flight had it been completed.
(Enclosure 21)
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34. LSO stated he waved the mishap FCLP period per the flight schedule. The follow-on
period was cancelled for weather. (Enclosure 16,21)

V. Background (Other FCLP Pilots/ODO)

35. ODO on the day of the mishap was fully qualified in accordance with VFA-97
SORM. He stated that he was familiar with all relevant publications and instructions and
had stood two prior duties while under instruction. He stated the first time he had stood
duty by himself was on the day of the mishap. (Enclosure 22)

36. VFA-97 CO was not aware that the ODO on the night of the mishap was standing his
first unassisted duty. (Enclosure 5)

37. ODO stated that he was added to the flight schedule the day of the mishap to fly an
FCLP flight. Another officer covered his ODO duties while he was flying. After
completing his flight, he again assumed duties as ODO. He stated that the brief for the
MF had already started when he took over. (Enclosure 22)

38. VFA-97 SOP states that the ODO shall ensure the safety of flight operations. The
ODO shall monitor field status and weather and advise when conditions may affect
operations. (Enclosure 18)

39. ODO was not aware of weather or status of divert field prior to brief or walk time for
mishap flight. (Enclosure 22)

40. Table 1 provides the pilots and aircraft in the mishap event (Enclosures 3,6,23,24).
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Table 1: Mishap Event Pilots and Aircraft
Aircraft 304

Mishap Pilot

Aircraft 305

Senior LT

Aircraft 313

LCDR (First FA-18 tour)

Aircraft 307

LCDR (Senior pilot)

VI. Background (NAS Lemoore/Reeves Field)

41. NAS Lemoore has offset parallel runways (32L/R and 14L/R) with rough dimensions
of 13500’ length and 200’ wide. (Enclosure 25)

42. The primary instrument runway at NAS Lemoore is 32L. It has Runway Edge
Lights, Touchdown Zone Lighting, Runway Centerline Lighting, Carrier Box Lighting,
Threshold Lights, and Approach Light System (ALS). (Enclosures 26,27)

43. Runway 32R does not have Carrier Box Lighting, Runway Centerline Lighting or
Approach Light System (ALS). (Enclosure 27)

44. All runway lighting was functional at the time of the mishap. (Enclosure 28)

45. Published approaches (and weather minimums) available to FA-18 (single pilot
absolute DH minimums are 200’AGL and weather 200-1/2) aircraft on runway 32L/R at
NAS Lemoore (elevation 234 feet) are outlined in table 2 (Enclosure 26).
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Table 2: Published Approaches Available at Time of Mishap

Runway

Approach

MDA/DH

Weather Minimums

32L

TACAN/ASR

540’ (MDA)

400-3/4*

32L

ICLS(ILS)

533’ (DH)

300-3/4*

32L

PAR

433’ (DH)

200-1/2

32L

ACLS(PALS)

433’ (DH)

200-1/2

32R

ASR

620’ (MDA)

400-1

32R

PAR

428’ (DH)

200-1/2

* When ALS inoperative increase visibility by ¼ mile.

46. Air Traffic Control Facilities Officer (ATCFO) stated that on the night of the mishap,
the ACLS and PAR approaches were not available on runway 32L. The 32L PAR was
down for an antenna, and the ACLS was down for data link. The PAR was NOTAM’ed
down and the ACLS was not. (Enclosures 28,29)

47. ATCFO stated reliability of NAS Lemoore ACLS system based on quarterly
messages as displayed in table 3.

48. ATCFO stated that the NAS Lemoore ACLS system is old and under funded relative
to the rest of the Navy’s ACLS systems. He stated this contributed to the poor reliability.
(Enclosure 28)

49. ATCFO stated that runway visual range (RVR) was the best method for determining
airfield visibility since it is located at the end of the runway. NAS Lemoore had
equipment to determine RVR on 32L and 32R, but the equipment on 32R was
cannibalized to support the system on 32L. On the night of the mishap, both systems
were down. ATCFO stated the RVR systems did not receive optimal support. (Enclosure
28)
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Table 3: NAS Lemoore ACLS Reliability by Quarter
Quarter

Channel A

Channel B

4QTR02

31%

40%

3QTR02

0%

80%

2QTR02

5%

90%

1QTR02

20%

25%

Note: Fog season in Lemoore is during 4QTR and 1QTR.
(Enclosure 28)

VII. Background (Tower Controllers)

50. ATCFO stated all tower controllers were fully qualified on the night of the MF.
(Enclosure 28)

VIII. Flight Brief

51. VFA-97 SOP states that flight briefs will normally begin two hours prior to launch.
VFA-97 CO stated that they normally schedule FCLP briefs 1.5 hours prior to launch.
(Enclosures 5, 18)

52. MF brief was scheduled 1.5 hours prior to launch and began at on time at 2045L.
(Enclosures 4,21)

53. OPNAVINST 3710.7S (General Flight and Operating Instructions) states that the
Mission Commander shall be responsible for all phases of the assigned mission except
those aspects of safety of flight that are related to the physical control of aircraft and fall
within the prerogatives of the pilot in command. (Enclosure 31)
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54. Mission Commander for mishap flight stated the he did not attend the MF brief.
(Enclosure 6)

55. OPNAVINST 3710.7S states that before commencing a flight, the pilot in command
shall be familiar with all available information appropriate to the intended operation.
Such information should include but is not limited to available weather reports and
forecasts, NOTAMs, fuel requirements, terminal instrument procedures, and alternatives
available if the flight cannot be completed as planned. In addition, the pilot in command
and mission commander shall conduct a risk assessment prior to the flight. (Enclosure
31)

56. The MF brief was given by the LSO and all FCLP pilots interviewed stated the
following (Enclosures 3,6,21,23,24):

a. Forecast and current weather were not briefed.

b. NOTAMs were not covered for NAS Lemoore or any possible divert fields.

c. Divert fields were not specifically addressed. Flight members assumed NAWS
China Lake would be open when if fact it was closed the night of the mishap.

d. MDA’s and DH’s were not covered for any of the approaches that were to be
utilized.

e. Weather minimums for each of the available approaches were not covered.

f. The FA-18 has three altitude warning systems; BARO / SRALT / HRALT.
Setting for these systems were not covered.
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g. Minimum fuel on deck and bingo fuels were not specifically covered.

h. Runway specific lighting was not covered.

i. ORM was not briefed and a risk assessment was not conducted.

j. The FCLP portion of the brief was complete and thorough.

57. The VFA-97 Shore Admin Briefing outline has bullets covering all items above, but
does not address ORM. (Enclosure 32)

58. LSO and pilots interviewed stated that the mishap brief was 10-15 minutes long.
(Enclosures 3,6,21,23,24)

59. When asked who did the flight planning, the pilot of 305 stated he didn’t believe
there was any. (Enclosure 23)

60. While the VFA-97 SOP has a section on Flight Member Standard responsibilities
that defines who is responsible for what part of preflight planning (i.e. dash two gets
weather and NOTAMs), the CO stated an FCLP mission are individual aircraft working
with the LSO and did not apply to the mishap event. (Enclosure 5,18)

61. LSO stated that he did not know the weather or NOTAMs when he left for the LSO
shack at the end of the runway (32L). (Enclosure 21)

62. MP stated that she did not know local weather or NOTAMs, or divert weather when
she walked to her aircraft. (Enclosure 3)

63. LSO stated that he had given the same brief many times since the squadron had
started FCLP. (Enclosure 21)
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64. Pilot of 305 stated it was a standard FCLP brief. (Enclosure 23)

65. One squadron pilot stated that seniors were “disdainful of briefs” and there was a
“lack of respect for brief sanctity.” (Enclosure 30)

66. CVW-11 Air Wing Commander, who flies with all four FA-18 squadrons, stated that
VFA-97 was at the bottom of the air wing in terms of overall quality of flight briefings.
He stated that the quality varied to a great extent by who was giving the brief. (Enclosure
33)

67. VFA-97 Training Officer (just checked into VFA-97 after completing a tour as a
TOP GUN instructor) stated that the briefs he had observed were lacking preparation and
were not as thorough as other fleet squadrons he had been in. (Enclosure 34)

68. CVW-11 LSO stated that VFA-97 did not seem quite up to their sister squadron’s
standards. (Enclosure 35)

69. VFA-97 CO stated he was happy with the quality of the flight briefs in the squadron.
(Enclosure 5)

IX. Sequence of Events

(The sequence of events is reconstructed using tower and approach control audiotapes as
well as debriefings of the pilots and the controllers. The mishap flight take-off and first
couple of passes in the FCLP pattern were uneventful and offer no pertinent data to this
report. This section will pick-up just prior to the weather change with all four aircraft in
the pattern and 313 on final approach. Times listed are GMT and are pulled from the
audiotapes. MP is Hawk 304.)
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70. Surface observation weather request shows that on the night of the MF visibility
went from 1 1/4 miles to 1/4 mile in nine minutes due to fog. (Enclosure 36)

71. 07:01:24 Hawk 313 at three miles (rwy 32L). (Enclosure 37)

72. 07:02:04 Tower passes visibility down to one half mile. Approach passes to each
aircraft that their next pass will be a full stop. Positive acknowledgement is received
from each aircraft. (Enclosure 37)

73. NASLEMINST 3710.1M states that when night/reduced visibility FCLPs are
conducted with an LSO on station, only carrier deck lighting is required unless additional
lighting is requested by the pilot/LSO. Runway edge lighting is required for full stop
landings. (Enclosure 38)

74. FAA INST 7110.65N states that at night when visibility drops below one mile, the
High Intensity Runway Lights (HIRL) must be turned up to step four and the Approach
Lighting System (ALS) must be turned up to step three. (Enclosure 39)

75. Both the Tower Supervisor and LSO recall HIRL on, but not the specific setting.
LSO stated the ALS was not turned on for any of the approaches to runway 32L.
(Enclosure 40)

76. At ½ mile vis, the weather is below minimums for all available published approaches
except for PAR to 32R. (Enclosure 26)

77. OPNAVINST 3710.7S states that an instrument approach shall not be commenced if
the reported weather is below published minimums for the type of approach being
conducted. However, once an approach has been commenced, pilots may, at their
discretion, continue the approach to the approved published landing minimums as shown
in the appropriate FLIP for the type approach being conducted. (Enclosure 41)
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78. 07:02:08 Hawk 313 reports clara (the pilot cannot see the “meatball”, i.e. glide slope
information on the Fresnel Lens Optical Landing System for rwy 32L). (Enclosure 37)

79. 07:02:12 Hawk 313 waves off approach for weather (rwy 32L). (Enclosure 37)

80. 07:02:47 LSO calls for taxi lights on. (Enclosure 37)

81. 07:03:04 LSO confirms ½ mile vis with Tower. (Enclosure 37)

82. 07:03:14 LSO requests approach lights turned up. LSO stated in his interview that
the ALS never got turned up on runway 32L. (Enclosures 21,37)

83. 07:03:52 Hawk 304 reports two miles (rwy 32L). (Enclosure 37)

84. 07:04:10 Hawk 304 waves off approach for weather (rwy 32L). Hawk 304 reports a
fuel state of 4600 lbs. (Enclosure 37)

85. 07:05:20 Tower asks LSO if he wants the lights on any higher. LSO tells tower to
crank them up a little bit. (Enclosure 37)

86. 07:05:30 LSO states “That’s good” in response to Tower’s light adjustment.
(Enclosure 37)

87. 07:05:33 Hawk 313 requests a PAR to runway 32R due to weather minimums.
(Enclosure 37)

88. 07:05:35 Hawk 305 at two miles (rwy 32L). (Enclosure 37)

89. 07:06:38 Hawk 305 touches down (rwy 32L). (Enclosure 37)
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90. 07:06:42 LSO asks Hawk 305 where he broke out. Hawk 305 replies; “there’s
really not a good breakout, about 250 feet, visibility is really low.” (Enclosure 37)

91. 07:06:56 Hawk 305 tells LSO that without ICLS, it is not even worth giving it a try.
He stated he was on the roll and he could hardly see. (Enclosure 37)

92. Pilot of Hawk 305 stated in the interview that that weather was less than 300/1 (ICLS
weather mins for 32L w/o ALS). He stated it was the lowest weather visibility he had
ever seen and he could barely see to taxi back to the line. Hawk 305 passed the weather
back to the SDO and stated he thought everyone would have to divert for weather.
(Enclosure 23)

93. 07:07:09 LSO asks the Tower for the status of the PAR radar on runway 32R.
(Enclosure 37)

94. 07:07:38 Tower asks the LSO; “We are below minimums and I hear, uh, some of
your people, uh, are going to be taking, uh, GCA’s to the right?” LSO replies,
“affirmative.” (Enclosure 37)

95. 07:08:33 Hawk 307 calls the ball (rwy 32L). (Enclosure 37)

96. 07:08:57 Approach control reports field now called visibility ¼ mile. (Enclosure
37)

97. Reported weather is now below single-piloted minimums for all available published
approaches on 32L or 32R. (Enclosures 26,41)

98. 07:08:58 Hawk 307 touches down (rwy 32L). (Enclosure 37)
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99. 07:09:15 LSO reports Hawk 307 is lifting (rwy 32L). (Enclosure 37)

100. Pilot of Hawk 307 (senior department head) stated in interview that he never saw
weather develop like it did the night of the mishap. He stated that after touchdown, he
had insufficient visibility to safely roll out and elected to take-off and execute a missed
approach. He stated the vertical visibility was good (you could look down and see the
runway while in the pattern), but the horizontal visibility was very poor. He stated that
with approach control in one radio and Tower/LSO in the other, it made it very hard to
pass tactical information regarding weather to other members of the flight. He did not
pass any weather information to LSO or other pilots airborne. (Enclosure 6)

101. 07:09:16 Tower tells LSO the fuel state of Hawk 313 is 4000 lbs. (Enclosure 37)

102. 07:09:20 LSO tells Tower to take Hawk 313 to a PAR to 32R or he would have to
do an emergency fuel bingo (low fuel profile to divert airfield). (Enclosure 37)

103. 07:09:27 Tower informs LSO that all airborne aircraft were being vectored to
approaches for runway 32R. (Enclosure 37)

104. 07:13:02 Hawk 313 at three miles for runway 32R, cleared to land by Tower.
(Enclosure 37)

105. 07:14:19 Hawk 313 rolls out on runway 32R. (Enclosure 37)

106. Pilot of Hawk 313 (LCDR) stated in interview that he broke out at 200 feet (AGL)
or a little below. He stated it was the worst weather he had ever landed in. He stated
forward visibility dropped to zero on touchdown and he would not have been able to
safely roll out utilizing runway edge lighting alone. He turned on his taxi light and was
able to pick-up the painted centerline stripe that facilitated a safe rollout. He did not pass
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this information to other members in flight due to the briefed radio set-up. (Enclosure
24)

107. 07:15:07 Hawk 304 at three miles for runway 32R (Enclosure 37)

108. 07:16:04 Hawk 304 on course, on glide path, at decision height. (Enclosure 37)

109. 07:16:14 Hawk 304 over landing threshold, slightly right of course. (Enclosure
37).

110. MP stated that the PAR approach was “pretty good.” MP stated that she did not
know runway 32R did not have centerline lighting. She also stated that she had never
landed on runway 32R without the taxi light on (taxi light was secured due to the
fog/weather). MP stated she saw the runway environment at decision height and made
the decision to continue the approach. She stated that as she entered the fog vertical
visibility was good, but horizontal visibility dropped. She stated that she could see the
runway as she touched down, but did not have adequate horizontal visibility. She stated
she received a “drifting right” call from approach as she touched down. She stated she
immediately saw the yellow arresting gear box marker and then hit the box with her left
main landing gear. She stated that the jet skidded across the runway and off the left side.
She shut down both engines and evacuated the aircraft. No ejection was attempted. MP
felt that she did not make the decision to go around early enough. (Enclosures 3, 42)

111. OPNAVINST 3710.7S states the following regarding precision approaches: “A
missed approach shall be executed immediately upon reaching the decision height unless
the runway environment is in sight and a safe landing can be made.” It also states: “If
runway/approach lights/runway lights are not in sight, execute missed approach.”
(Enclosure 41)

112. 07:19:23 Hawk 307 is at two miles (rwy 32R). (Enclosure 37)
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113. 07:20:09 Hawk 307 executes climb-out on missed approach for weather (rwy 32R).
(Enclosure 37)

114. 07:20:16 Departure asked Tower if the lights are up as bright as they go. Tower
replies with affirmative. (Enclosure 37)

115. 07:21:10 Hawk 307 requests a visual approach to runway 14. (Enclosure 37)

116. 07:23:23 Tower clears Hawk 307 to land on runway 14L (opposite end of the
mishap runway). (Enclosure 37)

117. Tower personnel are not aware of mishap and assume Hawk 304 has cleared the
runway. In fact, the runway is fouled by the mishap. (Enclosures 3,37)

118. Pilot of Hawk 307 stated that he planned on diverting after his missed approach to
runway 32R (his fuel state was 4300 lbs), but didn’t know where yet. He was told over
base radio that Fresno Yosemite International, NAWS China Lake, Edwards AFB, and
NAS Fallon were all closed or below weather minimums. He stated that as he flew north
on the missed approach, he could see the opposite ends of the runways clearly as
visibility was much better to the north. Pilot stated the reported weather was below
VFR/circling/IFR minimums and he did not request a contact approach. He was able to
keep the runway (14L) in sight the whole approach and safely landed. (Enclosure 6)

119. 07:23:48 All Hawks on deck. (Enclosure 37)

X. Command Climate

120. Everyone interviewed from VFA-97, with the exception of CO/XO, stated that
squadron morale was low at the time of the mishap. The following are quotes from the
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various interviews that help paint the picture; “not healthy”, “frustrating”, “morale low”,
“tired, beat-down”, “no stability”, “at times poor”, “mentally tired”, and “felt pressured”.
(Enclosures 3,6,21,22,23,24,34,43)

121. CVW-11 Air Wing Commander stated that VFA-97 morale was low. He stated that
it did not seem like the same Ready Room as during Operation Enduring Freedom. He
stated that the junior officers did not seem as pumped-up or happy-go-lucky as they were
in the past. (Enclosure 33)

122. CSFWP (Commodore) stated morale seemed down since last change of command.
There was a lot of micro managing. (Enclosure 44)

123. Both CVW-11 LSOs stated that they thought VFA-97 morale was low and the
junior officers seemed “beat-down, oppressed”. (Enclosure 35)

124. VFA-97 XO stated that morale was down and he characterized it as moderate/low.
(Enclosure 45)

125. VFA-97 CO stated that he thought squadron morale was average with the rest of the
air wing considering the circumstances of their tough schedule. (Enclosure 5)

126. All pilots interviewed stated that junior officer tactical progression was slow.
Junior officers stated that they did not advance in their tactical qualifications as rapidly as
their peers. Many stated this as a source of frustration. (Enclosures 21,23,30,34,43)

127. At the time of the mishap, VFA-97 had eleven first tour FA-18 pilots. None of
them were qualified Level IV (Division Leads) and only two were qualified Level III
(Section Leads). (Enclosure 46)
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128. Several VFA-97 junior pilots interviewed stated that the squadron ranked last
tactically out of the four fighter squadrons in CVW-11. (Enclosures 34,43)

129. VFA-97 CO stated the squadron was not as good tactically as they were last year.
(Enclosure 5)

130. Squadron SFWTI (Training Officer) stated the junior officers were not being
empowered to become tactical. (Enclosure 34)

131. CSFWP (Commodore) comments on his perceptions toward VFA-97: “VFA-97 is
in its own box”, “different atmosphere”, “they march to the beat of their own drummer.”
(Enclosure 44)

132. Weapons School CO stated that VFA-97 seemed to be the “black sheep” of the air
wing. (Enclosure 47)

133. VFA-97 CO stated that he was aware of the perception that VFA-97 does things
differently from other squadrons. (Enclosure 5)

134. During squadron Strike Fighter Advanced Readiness Program (SFARP), VFA-97
Operations Officer refused to sign the flight schedule for a period of three days. He
stated that CO made so many changes to the flight schedule it was impossible for him to
execute a training plan. (Enclosures 16,43)

XI. Risk Mitigation

135. OPNAVINST 3710.7S states that operational readiness and aviation safety are
enhanced by assuring that flight and other support personnel achieve and maintain an
optimal state of physical and emotional health. Conditions which reduce that state can
decrease performance and increase mishap potential. (Enclosure 47)
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136. OPNAVINST 3710.7S also states that numerous complex factors affect the
readiness of flight and support personnel. Those factors must be understood by all
concerned and appropriate countermeasures established to assure they do not reduce
personnel readiness. (Enclosure 47)

137. CNAP MSG 191006Z JUL 01 states that Commanding Officers should establish
vibrant unit-level ORM training programs. (Enclosure 48)

138. CAG stated that CVW-11’s inter-deployment schedule changed several times due
to real-world events. The end result had them prepared to deploy five months earlier than
originally expected. CVW-11 COMPTUEX and JTFEX were combined, accelerated,
and reduced. (Enclosure 33)

139. CVW-11 squadron composition changed from their last deployment with the
transition/addition of two new Super Hornet squadrons and reduction in the size of their
S-3 squadron. (Enclosure 33)

140. CAG stated that everyone knew there was increased risk associated with the new
schedule/composition. (Enclosure 33)

141. While CAG stated that he did not pass anything up the chain of command
specifically regarding the risk involved with the new schedule/composition, he did
recommended JTFEX be cut out of their turnaround cycle to provide a break in the
operational tempo. His idea was rejected. (Enclosure 33)

142. CAG stated that they conducted the Strike Leader Attack Training Syllabus
(SLATS) at NAS Lemoore vice NAS Fallon to reduce PERSTEMPO stress. (Enclosure
33)
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143. CAG stated that he did not require COs to provide him a risk management plan
relating to the accelerated schedule nor did he pass written guidance regarding risk
tolerance. He did provide verbal guidance on several occasions on specific events.
(Enclosure 33)

144. CAG stated that while he did direct each squadron to conduct a post-holiday safety
stand-down, he did not want to tell COs how to run their squadrons. (Enclosure 33)

145. CVW-11 Safety Report states in the last six months, CVW-11 has had nine mishaps
(2 Class A, 2 Class B, 5 Class C) and five other incidents worthy of safety reports
(inadvertent jettison of IMER, tie down chain not removed before flight, jet ran off
runway, EA-6B put into tension with the shot line foul, and top 2/3 of rudder fell off
during BFM). (Enclosure 49)

146. CVW-11 mishap rate during last six months is significantly higher than the overall
CVW average. (Enclosure 54)

147. CVW-11 Safety reports the following six VFA-97 safety incidents during last 90
days (Enclosure 49):
- CATM-88 departed aircraft on arrestment (class B)
- Aircraft departed runway on landing (class A)
- LATR pod departs aircraft on landing (CODR)
- CATM-7 fin fell off on arrestment (CODR)
- IMER fell off during weapons checks (CODR)
- Top 2/3 of rudder depart aircraft during BFM
(HAZREP)

148. NAS Lemoore weather forecaster stated that January is statistically the worst month
for Tule fog. (Enclosure 50)
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149. CAG stated that they looked at conducting FA-18 FCLPs at NAF El Centro, but the
idea was rejected after weighing detachment requirements against PERSTEMPO.
(Enclosure 33)

150. CVW-11 SFARP was conducted mid-July to mid-August. (Enclosure 51)

151. The Commanding Officer of Strike Fighter Weapons School Pacific (WSCO) stated
that VFA-97 performance during SFARP was well below fleet average and the bottom of
the four fighter squadrons in CVW-11. (Enclosure 51)

152. WSCO stated that his OPS O and XO came to him during CVW-11 SFARP with
concern over a string of incidents that were beginning to look like links in a mishap
chain. Three out of five of the incidents involved VFA-97 flights. (Enclosure 51)

153. WSCO stated that after ORM’ing the situation, they decided to take a day off from
flying to regroup and refocus. He discussed the reasons for the shutdown with all the
COs. VFA-97 CO wanted to fly unit level training flights instead of taking a day off
from flying. He was eventually overruled and all four squadrons took the day off.
(Enclosure 51)

154. WSCO stated his perception of VFA-97 included; poor communications flow,
department heads telling the CO what he wanted to hear, no accurate assessment from
front office on what was occurring in the squadron. (Enclosure 51)

155. WSCO stated that post-SFARP he briefed CAG/DCAG specifically on his concerns
regarding VFA-97 safety and tactical performance. He mentioned the lack of
communication and his concern about VFA-97 from a safety perspective. He also briefed
CAG/DCAG on the stand-down day and how it was brought about primarily due to VFA97 safety and maintenance considerations. He told them that VFA-97 did not seem to
want to participate in the SFARP program. (Enclosure 51)
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156. CAG stated that after his conversation with WSCO, he had a one-on-one counseling
session with VFA-97 CO regarding the perception that they did not cooperate during
SFARP. Conversation was primarily focused on personality concerns vice safety. He
recommended but did not direct, that the CO conduct a Safety Survey, Culture
Workshop, or Command Safety Assessment. (Enclosure 33)

157. VFA-97 CO stated he had a post-SFARP one-on-one discussion with CAG to talk
about personality conflicts during SFARP. He stated safety issues were not discussed.
(Enclosure 5)

158. VFA-97 CO stated that he attempted to schedule a Command Culture Survey, but
was not able to align schedules in available timeframe. (Enclosure 5)

159. VFA-97 CO stated he conducted several Safety Stand-downs that discussed the
schedule changes and additional risks, but did not specifically ORM the changes in
CVW-11’s deployment schedule. (Enclosure 5)

160. VFA-97 CO stated that the only change made to address their tight turnaround was
to reduce the FCLP requirements for the more experienced pilots. (Enclosure 5)
161. VFA-97 took one day off for Thanksgiving, two Sundays (8th/22nd) off, two days
off for Christmas (25th/26th), and two days off for New Years (1st/2nd). All other days,
including weekends, were workdays or travel days. Three of the work days were half
days (24th/29th/31st) and there were two five day leave periods over the holidays.
Maintenance was typically working two shifts of twelve hours each to get ready for the
upcoming at-sea period. (Enclosure 52)

162. CAG stated that he was aware of VFA-97 working hours and was aware of the low
morale. (Enclosure 33)
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163. VFA-97 Operations Officer stated that the expectation was for all officers to come
to work if Maintenance was working. (Enclosure 16)

164. LSO stated VFA-97 was behind in FCLPs due to weather. (Enclosure 21)

165. SDO on night of mishap stated he felt they probably would have cancelled for
weather if they didn’t have the upcoming at-sea exercise. He stated the mindset was “to
get it done even if it gets worse that night.” (Enclosure 22)

166. Pilot of 305 stated that at walk time they knew the field was IMC and weather was
deteriorating. (Enclosure 23)

167. All pilots interviewed stated the schedule had been very flexible in the weeks prior
to the mishap. (Enclosures 3,21,23,24,43)

168. Several pilots stated there was no stability in the schedule in general and this was a
source of frustration. (Enclosure 3,21,23,24,30,43)

169. VFA-97 Operations Officer stated that the schedule was flexible and it was tough to
plan your day. Changes were not unusual. (Enclosure 16)

170. All pilots interviewed stated that there was an unspoken pressure to finish FCLPs
and get all jets to the boat. (Enclosure 6,21,22,24)

171. VFA-97 Maintenance Officer stated there was mounting pressure to get FCLPs
done. He stated it was not overt, but significant. (Enclosure 6)
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XII. Damages and Costs

172. Damage and costs estimate are outlined in tables 4 and 5. There was no non-DOD
Property Damage. (Enclosure 53)

173. No personnel injuries. (Enclosure 53)

Opinions

I. Causal/Contributing Factors

1. The MP elected to continue an approach into a fog bank where adequate runway
visibility did not exist to safely land or rollout. This is in violation of OPNAVINST
3710.7S. The MP admits in the interview that the approach should have been
discontinued and a wave-off executed. This would have been a tough decision with the

Table 4: Mishap Aircraft Damage Costs

Aircraft
Port MLG Assy

54,000.

Port MLG Inboard Door

7,172.

Port Horizontal Stab Assy

25,830.

Port Aileron Assy

41,922.

Port Outboard Flap

15,762.

Port MLG Shock Absorber

31,519.

Engine Intake

205,000.

Engine Damage (2 X 256,308)

512,616.

Center Barrel Assembly

1,340,000.

Aircraft TOTAL COST

2,233,821.
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Table 5: DOD Property Damage (Arresting Gear)

DOD Property Damage (Arresting Gear)
Item

Qty Unit Cost

Total

Bolt

(12 X 37.08)

444.16

Flat Washer

(12 X .30)

3.60

Washer

(12 X 7.35)

88.20

Bolt

(8 X 13.15)

105.20

Nut

(8 X 2.50)

20.00

Pin

(4 X 45.96)

183.84

Screw

(16 X 17.42)

278.72

Plate

(4 X 58.32)

233.28

Screw

(4 X 9.38)

37.52

Plate

(1 X 27.38)

27.38

Bolt

(4 X .93)

3.72

Washer

(6 X .28)

1.68

Bolt

(2 X 1.07)

2.14

Spacer

(4 X 16.70)

66.80

Roller

(1 X 272.16)

272.16

Bearing

(2 X 140.00)

280.00

Shaft

(1 X 136.49)

136.49

O-Ring

(4 X 2.26)

9.04

Fitting Lug

(2 X .20)

0.40

Arresting Gear Sign

(1 X 2145.00)

2145.00

Arresting Gear TOTAL COST
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4339.43

close proximity of the aircraft to touchdown and insidious decline in visibility. The
weather conditions on the night of the mishap were especially tough given the fact that all
the pilots could see the runways looking down, but horizontal visibility was essentially
zero on deck.
Instrument approach minimums are designed to get the pilot safely below the
weather. Once a pilot sees the runway at decision height, it is not normal, and the pilot is
not mentally prepared to lose sight of it as the approach continues. This is precisely what
occurred on the night of the mishap. All the pilots airborne the night of the mishap
commented on how this sudden change in visibility surprised them on their approaches.
Unfortunately, the weather conditions were never passed from one pilot to the other.
(FOF 92,96,106,110,111,118)

2. All pilots flying on the night of the mishap flew approaches with the weather below
minimums. Three of the pilots flew approaches to both runways with weather below
minimums and the most senior pilot flew an illegal visual approach with the field calling
¼ mile visibility. They all admitted pushing their approaches below legal weather
minimums. There seemed to be a mindset that they had to get their aircraft on deck
rather than divert. The MP pilot, a ------------- aviator with the least experience of all the
pilots flying that night, was not equipped to operate in this mindset. The pressure for the
MP pilot to “hack it”, as her squadron mates were apparently doing, cannot be overstated.
(FOF 92,96,106,110,118)

3. Had the airfield lighting been set properly, and the ACLS or PAR to runway 32L been
functioning, this mishap may have been averted.

The past year’s NAS Lemoore

ACLS data shows system reliability at roughly 30% during peak fog season. Reliability
is so poor that the system was not even NOTAMed as unavailable on the night of the
mishap. While data could not be found stating an FAA requirement for airfield precision
approach system reliability, one could reasonably assume 30% availability for the ACLS
system is a little low. (FOF 46,47,48)
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4. FAA regulations state the requirements for airfield lighting at night in reduced
visibility. The lighting was not set properly on runway 32L on the night of the mishap.
The ALS was not turned on as required even after the LSO requested it. Had airfield
lighting been turned on promptly and correctly, pilots that waved off approaches to 32L
may have been able land without having to transition to 32R. (FOF 42,44,74,75,82)

5. Both RVR systems were down on the night of the mishap. Had both systems been
working, valuable time might have been saved in determining which runway had the best
visibility and therefore most suitable for landing. (FOF 49)

6. The flight brief was not conducted in accordance with standards established and
learned beginning with the first experiences in the training command. Multiple briefing
items mandated by instruction were not covered. All pilots were not in attendance. This
alone would not have been a safety issue if the pilots and LSO had bothered to get the
information they needed prior to walking. Unfortunately, no significant flight planning
appears to have been conducted before or after the brief. The forecast weather required a
divert field be available. Pilots in the flight assumed standard divert fields would be
open, when in fact they were closed. Forecast weather and approach minimums were not
known at walk time. This absence of flight planning, especially the lack of an available
divert, was likely in the back of each pilot’s mind as the weather deteriorated. (FOF
55,56,58,59,61,62)

7. The preponderance of personnel interviewed state that the poor brief given for the
mishap flight was not a one-time occurrence, but a systemic problem in VFA-97. The
CO did not acknowledge a deficiency in squadron briefing quality. (FOF
65,66,67,68,69)

8. The operational climate in VFA-97 did not embrace fundamentals of Naval Aviation
nor demonstrate adherence to basic operational risk management tenets. This created a
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high overall stress level and contributed to degraded performance by the MP and poor
decision-making by all pilots in the MF. Squadron morale was extremely low at the time
of the mishap. Everyone seemed to recognize this except for the CO. The squadron was
operating in a “reactive, crisis action mode,” rather than by using solid long term
planning, evidenced by frequent schedule changes and inability to execute a training plan.
The result was an extreme negative effect on the squadron’s emotional health. (FOF
120,121,122,123,125 134, 168,169)

9. VFA-97 lacks a robust program to tactically develop their young aviators. As a result,
their junior officers are well behind their peers in tactical progression. Squadron SWFTI
stated the young pilots were not being empowered to become tactical. This lack of
“tactical empowerment” likely contributed to the some of the poor/lack of decisionmaking on the night of the mishap. (FOF 126,127,130)

10. Ultimately a big factor in this mishap comes down to risk mitigation or lack thereof.
If you take a squadron, air wing, or battle group and continue to increase the operational
risk level without taking sufficient measures to mitigate risk, the eventual result will be a
mishap. It is safe to assume that this mishap would have the highest probability of
occurring in the weakest operational link. This mishap involved a below average pilot in
a below average squadron. The CO did not take any specific actions to reduce risk in the
squadron and does not appear to be embracing a “vibrant unit-level ORM training
program.” The result is a string of six safety incidents in the last 90 days including one
class A and one class B mishap. (FOF 17,18,19,20,21,68,128,129,147,151)

11. The working hours set by the CO to prepare for the upcoming exercise appear to be
excessive. While the squadron took two days off for Christmas and two for New Years,
those holidays are hardly conducive to reconstitution and relieving stress. The CO did
not appear to recognize the effect command climate and schedule was having on the
squadron, and therefore failed to take sufficient action to alleviate risk. (FOF
159,160,161,163)
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12. CVW-11 acknowledged the increased risk taken on by the air wing during the
current IDTC. A formal risk assessment was not conducted nor required of the squadron
CO’s. While measures were taken/requested to reduce mitigate risk, the overall air wing
mishap rate is extremely high during the last six months. The unspoken pressure of
CVW-11’s tight IDTC schedule is part of the environment in which the mishap occurred.
(FOF 138,139,140, 141,142,143,144,145,146,149)

II. Recommendations for Administrative or Disciplinary Action

1. Administrative/Disciplinary actions are in progress or completed for the Mishap Pilot,
Squadron Commanding Officer, and NAS Lemoore Tower Supervisor. Further action
will not be addressed in this document.

2. For VFA-97:

a. Review the 3710.7S rules for instrument flying and the importance of not
pressing them.

b. Conduct an AOM to hold frank and honest discussion with all officers on what
needs to be changed regarding command climate and morale. Do the same for enlisted
personnel in a Captain’s Call. Report results and changes to CVW-11.

c. Conduct a formal written squadron risk assessment and provide results to
CVW-11.

d. Discuss with Top Gun and SFWSP options/ideas to bring squadron SFWT
program back on track.

e. Correct flight briefing deficiencies outlined in Findings of Fact 51-69.
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3. For NAS Lemoore:

a. Provide all tower personnel additional training on field lighting requirements.

b. Re-emphasize to all tower personnel the importance of following all rules and
regulations using this mishap as an example.

c. If feasible, bring the ACLS system up to a reasonable level of reliability and
provide adequate support to both RVR systems.

4. For CVW-11:

a. Provide a lessons learned to CNAP to assist next CVW going through an
accelerated turnaround.

b. Schedule a meeting for CAG, DCAG, appropriate Battle Group staff, and all
squadron CO’s to discuss options for mitigating risk during the upcoming deployment.
Provide a written report to Battle Group Commander.

P. J. Kind
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

The mishap discussed in Chapter Two was ultimately caused by a combination of
human factors. Command climate was assessed to be unsatisfactory and in the end the
Commanding Officer was relieved of his command. Could this mishap have been
avoided? Perhaps if the leadership had recognized the change in organizational climate
and culture, a timely intervention might have been possible avoiding a costly mishap and
termination of a promising officer’s career. The first step toward prediction and
subsequent prevention of these types of accidents is finding a suitable model of human
behavior as it pertains to mishap causation. The Navy uses such a model based on the
work of Dr. James Reason.
Reason believed the problem of human error could be viewed in two ways: the
person approach and the system approach. Each model generates differing philosophies
towards error management. The person approach has traditionally been the more
widespread view of unsafe acts or errors. This approach tends to focus on individuals at
the “tip of the spear,” or those who are committing the errors. It provides an easy focus
and emphasizes the placing of blame on the individuals committing the error, as if that
alone will reduce the problem. It views these unsafe acts as arising primarily from
negligence, lack of motivation, inattention, etc. Practitioners of this philosophy place
great emphasis on reducing unwanted variability in human behavior. Methods toward
reducing errors include adding to procedures, disciplinary measures, retraining, blaming,
and shaming (Reason 2000).
The basic tenet in the system approach is that humans are fallible and errors are
expected, even in top organizations. Origination of errors is seen more as a consequence
of systemic problems residing within the organization, than specifically related to human
nature. Under this philosophy, one works not to change human behavior or condition,
but rather change the conditions under which humans work. A key theme is that of
46

system defenses. When an error occurs, the investigator does not look for an individual
who made a mistake, but rather focuses his efforts determining where the defenses broke
down. Rather than try and eliminate variability in human behavior, the system approach
embraces it. As changes occur within the operating environment, this diversity in
behavior enables the organization to generate a wide range of ideas to quickly assess and
improve its defense structure thereby mitigating risk. In this system diversity is valued
and enhances flexibility (Reason 2000).
The Swiss cheese model is a commonly used model in system approach accident
analysis. Conceptually, the system approach consists of many defensive layers or
controls. In Reason’s model each of these layers is thought of as a slice of cheese.
Ideally the defensive layers would be intact or solid, but in reality there are many holes or
openings that represent weaknesses in the layers. These holes arise for two reasons:
active failures and latent conditions (failures). The Naval Safety Center has adopted and
modified this model in their Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS) as depicted in figure 3.
Active failures are those unsafe acts or errors that are committed by personnel that
are taking part in the actual operation in which the mishap took place. Examples might
include the pilot flying the aircraft or the mechanic that performed a faulty repair. Latent
conditions or failures are more insidious and indirect. They generally occur as a result of
decisions or policy made by higher-level management. Latent failures can negatively
impact the operating environment and/or create holes or reduce defenses in individual
systems. In order for an accident to occur, the right combination of active and latent
conditions must exist within the organization (i.e. the holes within the Swiss cheese must
line up as depicted in figure 3).
Under the HFACS model, the key to mishap reduction and prevention is shrinking
or eliminating the holes within each defensive layer or slice. For a human behavior
model to be useful, it must be able to help prevent future catastrophes. Could the Navy’s
HFAC model have been useful in preventing the landing mishap discussed? This chapter
will apply the HFACS model against this tragedy to determine where the model makes
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Figure 3. HFACS’s Swiss cheese model (Naval Safety Center).

sense and where improvements may be warranted. First we need to have a better
understanding of the Navy’s model.
The HFACS model for human factor mishap causation divides active and latent
conditions into four key layers of defense: Unsafe Acts, Preconditions for Unsafe Acts,
Unsafe Supervision, and Organizational Influences. Each will be discussed in detail.

EXAMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL ACTS

Within the Navy Swiss cheese model, the first layer is Unsafe Acts, which as a
purely active condition primarily involves the mishap aircrew. Unsafe acts committed by
aircrew generally take on two forms, errors and violations. Humans by their very nature
commit errors. Violations, on the other hand, tend to be willful disregard for, or breaking
of the rules and regulations. They tend to occur less frequently. Not all errors and
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Figure 4. Unsafe Acts Classification (Naval Safety Center).

violations are equal and each is further broken down as shown in the chart displayed in
Figure 4.

Basic error forms are described as follows:

1. Decision Errors. They represent intentional behavior that proceeds as
intended, yet the plan proves inadequate or inappropriate for the situation. Whether the
individual chose poorly or just didn’t have sufficient information, a conscious decision
was made. These are sometimes referred to as “honest” mistakes and the key
differentiation is that the individual made a choice.

2. Skilled-Based Errors. Skill-based behaviors occur without significant
conscious thought. They are sometimes described as “stick and rudder” or basic flight
skills such as visual scan or checklist habit patterns. Because they are skill-based, they
are extremely sensitive to failures of attention or memory. These may be more likely to
occur when the individual is heavily tasked or distracted beyond his “comfort zone.” An
example most people can relate to, is going to the store and then forgetting what you
came to buy.
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3. Perceptual Errors. Suffice to say, if our perception of reality is not accurate
when flying, we are more likely to make mistakes. Perceptual errors usually stem from
mistaken or degraded sensory input. There are times when the brain, deprived of
sufficient sensory information, will “fill in the gaps” potentially providing false
information to the pilot. Examples of perceptual errors include perceiving “false
horizons” from weather or terrain during low visibility and the common misinterpretation
of light patterns when flying at night.

Violations are the willful departure from authority or regulations not normally
tolerated. They are broken into two categories as follows:

1. Routine Violations. Commonly referred to as “bending the rules”, these
violations are those that are considered habitual or in many cases tolerated. A nonaviation example would include the practice of many individuals who routinely drive 510 mph over the posted speed limit. They know it is illegal, yet they will still speed
because the authorities will not generally ticket them for the violation. When these types
of violations occur, it is imperative to look further up the supervisory chain of command
to see if there is tacit condoning of the violation.

2. Exceptional Violations. These are violations that are clearly outside the realm
of accepted behavior and not condoned by leadership. Using the speeding example
above, an individual driving 50 mph over the posted speed limit is an example of an
exceptional violation. It is important to note that while most exceptional violations are
heinous, they are not considered exceptional because of this. Rather, they are considered
exceptional because they are neither typical of the individual nor condoned by authority.

There were many active mistakes made which contributed to the FA-18 landing
accident. These unsafe acts committed are easily classified within the HFACS Unsafe
Acts category. Table 6 provides examples of unsafe acts found as casual factors in naval
mishaps and highlights those found in our mishap analysis. The mishap pilot made
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Table 6: Selected Examples of Unsafe Acts (Naval Safety Center)
(Unsafe acts found applicable to the case study mishap are in bold)

Unsafe Acts
Violations

Errors
Skill-based Errors

Routine Violations (Infractions)
Failed to Adhere to Brief
Inadequate Brief
Violation of NATOPS/Regs/SOP
- Failed to use RADALT
- Flew an unauthorized appch
- Failed to execute rendezvous
- Violated training rules
- Failed to adhere to departure
procedures
- Flew overaggressive maneuver
- Failed to properly prepare
for flight
- Failed to comply with NVG
SOP

Breakdown in Visual Scan
Delayed Response
Failed to Prioritize Attention
Failed to Recognize Extremis
Improper Instrument Cross-Check
Inadvertent use of Flight Controls
Omitted Step in Procedure
Omitted Checklist Item
Poor Technique
Decision Errors
Improper Takeoff
Improper Approach/Landing
Improper Procedure
Misdiagnosed Emergency
Wrong Response to Emergency
Exceeded Ability
Inappropriate Maneuver
Poor Decision

Exceptional Violations
Briefed Unauthorized Flight
Not Current/Qualified for mission
Intentionally Exceeded the Limits
of the Aircraft
Violation of NATOPS/Regs/SOP
- Continued low-altitude flight
in IMC
- Failed to ensure compliance
with rules
- Unauthorized canyon running
- Not current for mission
- Flat-hatting on takeoff
- Briefed and flew unauthorized
maneuver

Perceptual Errors
Misjudged Distance/Alt/Airspeed
Spatial Disorientation
Visual Illusion
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numerous decision, skill-based, and perceptual errors. There were also a surprising
number of violations, not just by the mishap pilot, but also by the other pilots in the flight
as well as the ODO. The number of errors and violations appears excessive, certainly
more than would be expected from a normal FA-18 squadron. Why was this first layer of
defense so weak? None of the pilots flying that day had a history of unsafe behavior or
rule violation. They had all flown in multiple other squadrons without problems. It
would be a stretch to call this group an anomaly or below average. It appears there were
other forces at work, reducing the defense barrier of this first layer. We need to move to
the next layer and examine the more latent causal factors.

EXAMINATION OF PRECONDITIONS

As we move from the first barrier to the second, we are moving our discussions
from active failure points to more latent conditions. While not directly causing an
accident, existence of these weaknesses in many cases make the occurrence of the mishap
possible. Within the naval model this second barrier is defined as Preconditions for
Unsafe Acts. Figure 5 outlines the specific classification structure within this category.
There are two major divisions of unsafe aircrew conditions, each with their specific
causal categories. They are the Substandard Conditions of Operators and Substandard
Practices of Operators. Substandard Conditions of Operators tend to be aero medical in
nature and the sub-categories are described in subsequent paragraphs.

1. Adverse Mental States. Mental preparation is critically important in aviation
where there is little margin for error or mistake. This category covers mental states that
could negatively affect performance. Examples include: mental fatigue, loss of
situational awareness, distraction, overconfidence, arrogance, and misplaced motivation.

2. Adverse Physiological States. The second category, adverse physiological
states, pertains to medical or physiological conditions that may impact safe operations.
Of particular importance to Naval Aviation are conditions such as G-induced loss of
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Figure 5. Preconditions for Unsafe Acts Classification (Naval Safety Center).

consciousness, hypoxia, alcohol effects, physical fatigue, medication effects and a myriad
of medical conditions known to impact performance. One example might be the pilot
flying with a slight head cold. This would likely have an impact on his ability to rapidly
climb or descend and would probably have a negative impact on his spatial orientation if
flying at night or in instrument conditions.

3. Physical/Mental Limitations. This category refers to those instances when the
mission requirements exceed the capabilities of the pilot at the controls. This generally
happens for two reasons. First, the pilot may be physically outside the anthropometrical
norms and thus have a harder time flying the aircraft properly. He might not be physical
strong enough to effectively operate in certain environments (i.e. flying an FA-18 is
much harder physically than flying a P-3). The second reason why there might be
limitations is due to the external environment. For example; flying on night vision
goggles without moon illumination. The mission will not likely change, but the pilot’s
visual acuity will be markedly decreased.

Substandard Practices of Operators are divided into two categories as follows:
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1. Crew Resource Mismanagement. This category includes coordination both
within and between aircraft, air traffic control, maintenance personnel, and any other
support personnel associated with the flight. It is important to note, especially in light of
our single-seat mishap example, that aircrew coordination does not just include the flight
portion, but also the planning, coordination, and brief/debrief.

2. Personal Readiness. Personal readiness failures occur when individuals fail to
prepare physically or mentally for the flight. Typical examples include self-medicating,
consuming alcohol too close to brief time, or overdoing a physical fitness routine. While
some of these are violations, they do not occur in the cockpit and therefore are not active
failures.

Table 7 displays selected examples of Unsafe Aircrew Conditions with those
applicable to our mishap analysis highlighted. What draws immediate attention is that all
the failures in our investigation are in two distinct areas, Adverse Mental States and Crew
Resource Management.
Due to a change of deployment date, the mishap squadron’s turnaround cycle was
significantly compressed, putting considerable pressure on reaching readiness goals.
Complacency, distraction, mental fatigue, and stress are not unusual within squadrons
under high-tempo operations. Could the adverse mental states be a result of the
compressed schedule, a possible negative latent condition? There were two other FA-18
squadrons in this air wing under the same pressures as the mishap squadron. Interviews
with pilots from these squadrons showed they were not wrestling with the same
problems.
The failures in Crew Resource Management are significant and disturbing. Once
again this was not just a failure of the mishap pilot, but of everyone involved in the flight.
With better leadership, coordination, cooperation, and communication, this accident may
have been prevented. Unfortunately, these skills were not encouraged within the
squadron (an upstream latent condition). When these pilots, operating in an environment
that did not encourage tactical development or leadership, got into a situation which
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Table 7: Selected Examples of Preconditions for Unsafe Acts (Naval Safety Center)
(Preconditions found applicable to the case study mishap are in bold)

Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
Substandard Conditions of Operators

Substandard Practices of Operators

Adverse Mental States

Crew Resource Management

Channelized Attention
Complacency
Distracted
Mental Fatigue
Get-home-it is
Haste
Life Stress
Loss of Situational Awareness
Misplaced Motivation
Task Saturation

Failed to Back-up
Failed to Communicate/
Coordinate
Failed to Conduct Adequate
Brief
Failed to Use All Available
Resources
Failure of Leadership
Misinterpretation of Traffic Calls
Trans-cockpit Authority Gradient
Personal Readiness

Adverse Physiological States
G-Induced Loss of Consciousness
Impaired Physiological State
Medical Illness
Physiological Incapacitation
Physical Fatigue

Excessive Physical Training
Self-Medicating
Violation of Crew Rest Rqmts
Violation of Bottle-to-Brief Rqmts

Physical/Mental Limitation
Insufficient Reaction Time
Visual Limitation
Incompatible Intelligence/Aptitude
Incompatible Physical Capability
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required someone to take charge and make decisions, they responded exactly as would be
expected.

EXAMINATION OF SUPERVISION

Many naval mishaps have causal factors related to errors committed within the
supervisory chain of command. Our mishap is no exception. Unsafe Supervision
represents purely latent failures. Because the supervisory breakdowns are not typically
related to the actual mishaps and may preexist for a significant amount of time, their
relationship to the mishap is sometimes not intuitive. HFACS divides Unsafe
Supervision into four categories outlined in figure 6.

1. Inadequate Supervision. A supervisor, leader, or manger is expected to
provide guidance, motivation, appropriate training, and vision to safety execute the
organizational mission. He also sets appropriate expectations and provide a role model
for those operating within his sphere of influence. Unfortunately, as was the case in our
mishap, adequate supervision is not a given within any organization.

2. Planned Inappropriate Operations. An inappropriate operation occurs when
the operation tempo and/or schedule are planned such that individuals are put at

UNSAFE
SUPERVISION

Inadequate
Supervision

Planned
Inappropriate
Operations

Failed to
Correct
Problem

Supervisory
Violations

Figure 6. Unsafe Supervision Classification (Naval Safety Center).
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unacceptable risk, crew rest is jeopardized, and ultimately performance is adversely
affected. Clearly within the military the acceptable level of risk may change depending
of deployment requirements and whether it is peacetime or combat operations. An
operation could be judged inappropriate if it was outside the normal expectation for a
similar unit in comparable circumstances.

3. Failed to Correct a Known Problem. This third category of Unsafe
Supervision refers to those instances when the supervisor knows deficiencies among
individuals, equipment, training, or other related safety areas, but no action to correct
them is taken.

4. Supervisory Violations. This category is reserved for those instances when
supervisors managing assets willfully disregard existing rules and regulations.

Table 8 provides examples of each category of Unsafe Supervision. What makes
this category harder to apply to our mishap is that the squadron CO did not think there
was a problem within his unit. Clearly there was a lack of oversight and in hindsight he
permitted inappropriate operations. While there were individual violations of NATOPS,
SOP, and regulations on the day of the mishap, it is not clear how chronic this condition
was within the squadron.

EXAMINATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES

The final barrier or “slice” in the HFACS model is Organizational Influences.
Decisions of upper-level management directly affect supervisory practices and conditions
as well as the actions of individual operators. These influences usually represent the
most latent conditions and as such may be in place well before the mishap. These
failures occur in areas relating to resource management, climate, or processes as shown in
figure 7.
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Table 8: Selected Examples of Unsafe Supervision (Naval Safety Center)
(Supervision shortfalls found applicable to the case study mishap are in bold)

Unsafe Supervision
Failed to Correct a Known Problem

Inadequate Supervision
Failed to Provide Guidance
Failed to Provide Operational
Doctrine
Failed to Provide Oversight
Failed to Provide Training
Failed to Track Qualifications
Failed to Track Performance

Failed to Correct Document in
Error
Failed to Identify an At-Risk
Aviator
Failed to Initiate Corrective
Action
Failed to Report Unsafe
Tendencies

Planned Inappropriate Operations
Failed to Provide Correct Data
Failed to Provide Adequate Brief
Time
Improper Manning
Mission Not IAW with NATOPS/
Regs/SOP
Permitted Unnecessary Hazard
Provided Inadequate Opportunity
for Rest
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Supervisory Violations
Authorized Unnecessary Hazard
Failed to Enforce NATOPS/
Regs/SOP
Failed to Enforce T&R Manual
Authorized Unqualified Crew for
Flight

ORGANIZATIONAL
INFLUENCES

Resource
Management

Organizational
Climate

Organizational
Process

Figure 7. Organization Influences Classification (Naval Safety Center).

1. Resources Management. This encompasses management, allocation, and
maintenance of all organizational resources including personnel, budgets, equipment and
facilities. Typical areas looked at here include manning and training levels, cost-cutting
measures, and suitability and upkeep of equipment and spaces.

2. Organizational Climate. In general, organizational climate is the prevailing
atmosphere or environment within the organization. It is broken into three subcategories; structure, policies, and culture. Structure refers to chain-of-command,
delegation of authority and responsibility, communication channels, and formal
accountability for actions. Policies refer to a course or method of action that steers the
decision-making process. Culture refers to unspoken or unofficial rules, values, attitudes,
beliefs, and customs of an organization.

3. Organizational Process. This refers to the formal process by which things get
done within the organization. Many areas are covered here under sub-categories
operations, procedures, and oversight. These include; operational tempos, time pressures,
production goals, schedules, procedures and standards, and finally risk management and
safety considerations.

The Organization Influences having the greatest impact on our landing mishap
were undoubtedly Organizational Climate and Organizational Process as shown in table
9. Weaknesses in the mishap squadron’s Operational Processes were magnified when
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Table 9: Selected Examples of Organizational Influences (Naval Safety Center)
(Organizational Influences found applicable to the case study mishap are in bold)

Organizational Influences
Organizational Process

Resource Management
Human Resources
- Selection
- Staffing/Manning
- Training

Operations
- Operational tempo
- Time pressure
- Production quotas
- Incentives
- Measurement/Appraisal
- Schedules
- Deficient planning

Monetary/Budget Resources
- Excessive cost cutting
- Lack of funding
Equipment/Facility Resources
- Poor design
- Purchasing of unsuitable
equipment

Procedures
- Standards
- Clearly defined objectives
- Documentation
- Instructions

Organizational Climate

Oversight
- Risk Management
- Safety Programs

Structure
- Chain-of-command
- Delegation of authority
- Communication
- Formal accountability for
actions
Policies
- Hiring and firing
- Promotion
- Drugs and alcohol
Culture
- Norms and rules
- Values and beliefs
- Organizational justice
- Citizen behavior
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their schedule was accelerated. The constantly changing flight schedule is one example
that demonstrated the squadron’s inability to formulate a solid plan and then executing it
without change.
The investigation also brought to light serious communication problems within
the mishap squadron. These along with several comments regarding the “micromanaging” and “toxic environment” are prime examples of the weaknesses within the
organizational climate.
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CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the concept of safety culture
and safety climate within high-risk industries. They have been defined as follows (Zhang
2002):
1. Safety Culture. The enduring value and priority placed on worker and public
safety by everyone in every group at every level of the organization. It refers to the
extent to which individuals and groups will commit to personal responsibility for safety;
act to preserve, enhance and communicate safety concerns; strive to actively learn, adapt
and modify (both individual and organizational) behavior based on lessons learned from
mistakes; and be rewarded in a manner consistent with these values.
2. Safety Climate. The temporal state measure of safety culture, subject to
commonalities among individual perceptions of the organization. It is therefore
situationally based, refers to the perceived state of safety at a particular place at a
particular time, is relatively unstable, and subject to change depending on the features of
the current environment or prevailing conditions.
The HFAC model takes these definitions one-step further and applies them to
overall organizational (command) culture and climate. Unfortunately the model does not
provide a method to show the impact culture and climate has on every defensive layer
within the adopted Swiss cheese model. A poor or dysfunctional command environment
does not act purely within its own “slice of cheese” or defensive barrier, but has an
insidious effect on every layer. The HFAC model does not fully model this global
organizational effect on system defenses. In our mishap investigation, the causal latent
failures in every barrier can be traced back to the CO’s change of command date. His
adverse effect on the squadron climate and culture touched every layer of defense. Even
the active failures (Unsafe Acts) to a great extent, can be traced back to the change of
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command. The complacency, disregard for flight preparation, and drop in tactical
performance can all be traced to the CO assuming command. The squadron’s poor or
dysfunctional culture and climate had essentially increased the size or weaknesses of the
holes in the first defensive layer. The supervisory error, while minimal, was legitimate.
Supervisory error is not the same as poor command climate as it only acts within a single
defensive layer. In a healthy environment the mishap squadron could have functioned
safely with a similar level of supervisory failure.
Clearly the Air Wing Commander knew the squadron was having problems and in
hindsight, could have provided more assistance. In his defense, the tools available to
assist him in recognizing organizational problems and providing help with timely positive
intervention were very limited. There is a philosophy within the Navy of “letting CO’s
be CO’s,” meaning that as an Air Wing Commander; you would hesitate to intervene
unless you were absolutely sure there was a problem. In this case, intervention came too
late. Clearly more help is needed to provide our leadership with the confidence for early
recognition and assistance in these types of organizational climate/culture problems.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The essential purpose of mishap investigation and creating models of causation is
to prevent future accidents from occurring. If we can identify an organization that is at
risk early enough, we can step-in and take corrective action to hopefully prevent a
negative result. In the mishap we investigated, there were many possible levels of
intervention, that had they been made early enough, may have prevented the mishap.
Unfortunately, the only significant intervention made was the most drastic (relieving the
CO) and it came too late to prevent the loss of an aircraft. Earlier actions may have
included; counseling, special training, safety surveys, command intervention teams, and
possibly earlier disciplinary action.
The key to timely intervention is identifying organizational problems early. We
can take our analysis and create a list of warning signs that point to potential
organizational dysfunction. These indicators could be used to help leadership make
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intervention decisions. These indicators of poor climate/culture are not absolutes, but
rather general indicators of potential latent failures.

1. Poor organizational communication. Effective communication is essential for
any organization to operate safely. It touches every aspect of an organization and if it is
not efficient, it will contribute to culture and climate problems.

2. Slower than normal or arrested professional (tactical) development. Every
person desires the opportunity to progress professionally. When they are held back
relative to their peers, it has a negative effect on their ability to make decisions and act
decisively in the absence of their immediate supervision. Generally speaking, personnel
will rise to the level expected of them. If you don’t give them responsibility, they won’t
act responsibly.

3. A sudden decrease in organizational operational performance. There could be
many reasons why there might be a decrease in an organization’s performance. Once all
the other possibilities are eliminated, it is probably a good indicator of a negative culture
or climate change.

4. An increase in organizational safety incidents/accidents. In absence of any
other obvious explanations, this is another indicator of negative organizational change.

5. A higher than average safety incident/accident rate. This becomes much more
ominous if the leadership does not acknowledge there is a problem.

6. Doing things “differently” and then performing below average. Sometimes
doing things different from your competitors is a sign of visionary or innovative
leadership. However, if there is not a corresponding improvement in operational
performance, this then becomes a warning sign of poor leadership and potential latent
failures.
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7. Below average execution of long term planning. Effective long term planning
and execution is essential for an organization’s emotional health. Most people do not like
to operate in a “crisis-action” or “reactionary” mode for extended periods of time.
Failures in planning can easily become latent failures within defensive barriers.

8. Poor morale. People function more effectively and are more productive when
they are satisfied. When morale is poor, every weakness within each defensive barrier
becomes magnified. Morale is very hard to quantify and every organization has their ups
and downs. Yet poor morale is one of the most important indicators of command climate
problems. It must be assessed in conjunction with the other indicators.

9. Micro-managing or top-down leadership. Many organizations and managers
have been extremely successful with this leadership style. Unfortunately, if it exists in
combination with other indicators such as below average performance and poor morale, it
is a warning sign of latent organizational problems.

Each of these warning signs was present within VFA-97 in the year preceding
their mishap and yet there was no tool in place to help the air wing commander make an
intervention decision. Perhaps this list can be used to prevent a similar mishaps from
occurring in the future.
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